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Brett Bodemer (Moderator): [Background Music] Welcome to Conversations with Cal Poly 
Authors. This episode was recorded on Friday, November 6th, 2015 at the Robert E. Kennedy 
Library at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. This conversation feature Sarah Bridger and Shelley Hurt 
discussing Sarah's book Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research. Published 
by Harvard University Press in 2015. Sarah Bridger is an assistant professor of history at Cal 
Poly. She received her B.A. from Brown and her PhD from Columbia where her dissertation won 
the 2012 Allan Nevins Prize from the Society of American Historians. Her current research 
commensurate with her interest in the cold war, exposed aspects of the political, economic, 
and ideological battles over science between the 1970s including changes in defense contract 
and the privatization, the activism of women in STEM fields and the rise of citizen science. 
Sarah's conversational partner today is Dr. Shelley Hurt, associate professor of political science 
at Cal Poly. Before arriving at Cal Poly, Professor Hurt was a research associate at Dartmouth 
and also taught at Vassar. Shelley teaches courses on international relations, technology and 
public policy, and global and political issues. She is coeditor of a recent RIPE book titled Hybrid 
Rule and State Formation: Public-Private Power in the 21st Century, and is currently putting the 
finishing touches on a book titled Winning the Cold War Science Race: US Foreign Policy and the 






SB: Thank you. I want to start by saying thank you to Brett for organizing this event and to 
Karen Lauritsen as well, and to Shelley for being my interlock guitar. I wouldn't have called you 
that but now I think I should. And thank you also to the History Department and wonderful 
colleagues. And to many of my students, especially students who have been in my Cold War 
Science and Society seminars that have contributed to this book perhaps in ways they don't 
realize but should. And thank you everyone as well for coming. This is a really great turnout. I 
was asked somewhat earlier in the organizing process to talk initially about how I got interested 
in this topic. And the truth is that's a somewhat roundabout story. The book Scientist at War 
came out of my dissertation at Columbia which was a somewhat narrower discussion of 
scientists and ethics during the cold war. But when I entered graduate school in 2003, I did not 
think of myself as somebody who was a cold war historian or a historian of science. I was really 
interested in labor history, and especially late 19th and early 20th century labor history. And as 
an undergraduate—so, for the students here, when I was your age, I had written a senior thesis 
about a coal mining strike in Kentucky that was led by communists and I sort of figured that 
that's where I would make my career, studying labor history. And labor history might seem kind 
of far afield from the topic of cold war science but in retrospect, and it's really only in 
retrospect I think that I realized this, these two topics have a lot in common. Because the 
questions that I was asking in labor history had a lot to do with how people think about what 
they're doing, how people think about their work. If you go to work every day, how do you 
understand the labor that you're performing and how do you understand your labor in a 
context larger than yourself? If you are going to go on strike with other people, it means that 
you are thinking about your work in some kind of larger context. And in a way, these are kind of 
similar questions to the questions that I'm asking in my book. We don't often think of nuclear 
physicists as workers or as part of labor history. But we probably should perhaps, and they 
certainly can be. And the truth is also that I didn't go directly from college to graduate school. I 
actually spent several years in the middle living in New York City and working as a professional 
investigator and I investigated police misconduct cases for the city of New York. And I think that 
job as well in retrospect I realized oriented me towards thinking about questions of ethics, 
questions of professionalism in ways that I maybe wasn't fully aware of as they were 
happening, but kind of managed to worm their way into my research interest later. And those 
years also happened to coincide with an extraordinarily tumultuous period in terms of global 
events. It was the years of the attacks on September 11th, the beginning of the war on terror, 
the war in Iraq, huge protests in New York City against the war in Iraq. And so by the time I got 
to graduate school, I wrote on my application, you know, late 19th century labor history but my 
interest were already evolving. And, you know, the papers that I wrote tended to move farther 
and farther into more recent history into the 20th century. And the topics became a little more 
distanced from traditional labor history. And then about 10 years ago, I read a biography of 
Robert Oppenheimer called American Prometheus by Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, which is a 
great book. I highly recommend it. And that book about Robert Oppenheimer, who is 
considered the father of the atomic bomb, seem to touch on every topic and issue and theme 
and question that I had ever thought was interesting. His life story was fascinating and the kinds 
of ethical and political questions that he was grappling with, with kind of the highest stakes 
imaginable was utterly compelling to me. And so I just started on my own to read widely in the 
memoirs of Manhattan project scientists and it—some of the literature of that era. And one of 
the first books that I read was a memoir by a mathematician, a Polish mathematician who came 
to the United States named Stanislaw Ulam and he's probably most famous for working with 
Edward Teller to develop the hydrogen bomb. And in his book, he wrote that he didn't believe 
that scientists were somehow ethically responsible for the applications of their research. So, if 
you research something and some government official or military lab took that research and 
turned it into a weapon, that's sort of beyond your control and you don't have any special 
obligations because you are a scientist who generated that original research. And what it boiled 
down to, to Ulam, and I'm quoting him here. He said that, "even the simplest calculation in the 
purest mathematics can have terrible consequences." And the example that he used was to say, 
"Should we go back in time and uninvent calculus because that led to so many weapons being 
produced later? Of course not." And I found this really interesting for a number of reasons. I 
sort of agree with the statement, I sort of don't agree with the statement, but I found it 
interesting that Ulam was very introspective in this book. He was thinking about the ethical 
consequences of what he had done. He was trying to come up with some kinds of principles 
that he could use to understand his own research and his own work in this larger cold war 
context. So, that is to say I didn't necessarily agree with the end point that he reached, but I 
found it interesting that he was a thoughtful, introspective person thinking about all sorts of 
philosophical ideas in addition to his own mathematical work. And from there, I realized what 
my project was, which is that I wanted to examine how scientists themselves have thought 
about questions of ethics as they relate to their own research. So, not outside philosophers or 
political scientist coming in, but how do these scientists themselves generate these ideas and 
discuss and debate these ideas, and then how do they act in response to those ideas? And I was 
also interested in a particular timeframe, which is the period after the Manhattan project. A lot 
of Manhattan project physicists in the years afterwards kind of reflected back on the work that 
they had done. They talked about—Oppenheimer famously said that physicists had known sin, 
that they had a special ethical obligation because their discipline that created this weapon. But 
what did that mean over the rest of the cold war, what did that mean for these same scientists 
in the 1950s or in the 1960s or the 1980s beyond the Manhattan project? Where did these 
ethical reckonings lead them? And so, that's kind of, in a nutshell, maybe that's a large nutshell, 
but in—that's the sort of central premise of the research that eventually became this book. And 
so, one of the other questions I was asked was to talk a little bit about the research process, 
which was much more challenging than I anticipated. It's great when somebody like Stanislaw 
Ulam writes a book and has a little section in which he talks about his ethical ideas about what 
he was doing. But most scientists don't do that. Most scientists don't write memoirs. If you're 
lucky, maybe they'll donate some of their papers to the university archive or their—they will 
correspond with somebody who donated papers to an archive, but it becomes rather 
challenging to kind of go through the historical record and try to figure out how scientists talked 
about these issues. And so, a lot of the research that I did took place in people's personal 
papers and sifting through hundreds if not thousands of letters and memos, the meetings of 
various minutes. I looked through a lot of institutional records at universities, faculty—no, not 
faculty meeting minutes per se, but similar kinds of documents to see if I could find some 
examples of people talking about these issues and they're there but they're buried in kind of 
the luminous pieces of paper. So, you may have to read through a hundred letters to get to the 
one letter in which a scientist says, "I'm uncomfortable with the way that my research on plant 
hormones is being used to develop Agent Orange." You know, and that's the letter that you 
want to work with. So, that's a pretty involved process. I also looked a lot at how scientists 
acted on their ethical impulses which often translated into government advising. And so, I 
ended up at a lot of the presidential libraries, going through—speaking of voluminous pieces of 
paper—going through this just torrent of paper produced by our bureaucratic institutions trying 
to find, you know, that one or two, you know, sections of some document in which we can get a 
little window into how scientists are thinking about ethics. And some of the major episodes that 
I talk about in the book include scientist especially physicists working to promote arms control 
after the Manhattan project and entering government and military service even and trying to, 
from within, promote arms control and is trying to promote peace, trying to ensure that the 
weapons that they have contributed to developing were never actually used. And I look at the 
nuclear test ban treaty debates in the late '50s, in the early 1960s and then the heart of the 
book looks at the Vietnam War era. And really what happened to the Manhattan project 
generation who had entered government as advisors and were sort of ensconced in all these 
advisory positions just as the war in Vietnam began to escalate. And for many of them that 
created a second moment of ethical crisis. If the first was the Manhattan project, the second 
was the war in Vietnam and what it told them about their own work, arguably their own 
complicity by being part of a government that was waging this war and that created a lot of 
ethical challenges. Along the way, of course, I realized that the Manhattan project generation 
isn't the only generation of interest, there is a younger generation coming of age in the same 
era and they tend to think about ethics in different ways. And so, one of the arguments that I 
make in the book is that especially Manhattan project physicists tended to think about ethics in 
kind of an individualized way, which is to say, "I'm a physicist. I worked on the Manhattan 
project. I now have a personal obligation to work for peace to work within some of these arms 
control organizations." There's a second younger generation of scientists that comes of age in 
the 1960s and '70s and they tend to take a much more institutional approach. In other words, 
to make arguments about what it means to be an individual scientist working within a larger 
institution. And these are people who are thinking about how defense contracting works, what 
it means to be, let's say a chemistry professor at MIT where the university itself is infused with 
defense department money. Does that change the kind of research you are encouraged to do? 
Does that subtly shape the questions that you think are important to research? And these 
questions are sort of institutional ethics or the ethics of individuals within institutions that 
actually take pretty radical forms by the time we get to the 1960s and '70s. And so, it's rather 
interesting in the late '50s, a lot of scientists argued that as part of the space race and the 
scientific race with the Soviet Union, we should pour a lot of money into scientific research in 
universities, that's in the late 1950s. A decade later, the campuses of those universities are 
erupting with students protesting those exact kinds of contracts. So, how do we get from one to 
the other? I think thinking about ethics and thinking about how scientists understand their 
responsibilities can help us answer some of those questions. So, there's a lot more that I could 
say about the book. I don't want to keep talking forever about it. So, maybe I'll stop here and 
give Shelley a chance to weigh in. 
 
SH: Well, great. Thank you. I'm delighted to be here. As I said, I'm so happy with this fantastic 
turnout. I told Sarah before this started that I could talk for hours about this. And so, my biggest 
challenge was to try to think about a couple of broad themes to spark conversation geared 
mostly to all these students that have come out, which I'm so happy to see. So, the first one 
kind of jumps off from where you just left off about thinking about the straight off between 
institutional incentives and power structures versus individual consciences. One of the big 
themes that runs throughout Professor Bridger's book is how scientists at—in these different 
eras tried to navigate that challenging terrain. And one of the things, since you brought up 
Robert Oppenheimer's biography, I was thinking about the recent cases not only of 
Oppenheimer but because a lot of students may have seen the movie, "The Imitation Game" 
recently about Alan Turing, and in those context, it raises a higher kind of barrier for us to think 
about why or how working within a system is to the scientist's advantage. So, I just would like 
to hear what you think about that challenge? 
 
SB: Yeah. That's a great question. I mean, there's a challenge that—I mean, arguably, there's 
still a few branches of science where you can kind of go off into a room and think your own 
thoughts, maybe if you're a mathematician and you're trying to prove some theorem. But a lot 
of science takes equipment and it takes funding and that has to come from somewhere. It takes 
collaborative efforts. And institutions are the way those things happen. And so, it's, you know, 
something that scientist need to deal with to think about these institutions. But I also think it's 
tricky. To give an example of some of the trickiness, at Princeton University in the early 1970s, 
there are big student protests about defense contracting and classified research on campus and 
the kind of Princeton administration actually did a lot of soul searching on this question to try 
to figure out, you know, how can Princeton be an ethical institution? Should we get rid of all 
our defense contracts? Should we get rid of classified research? Or is there an importance to 
these things? And that question kind of paralyzed people at Princeton and there were a lot of 
very famous brilliant people—Thomas Kuhn the—probably arguably the most famous of the—
more recent historians of science was actually the head of a committee that went through all of 
these questions. And he was totally paralyzed by these questions. But it's sort of interesting on 
one specific case, there was a professor at Princeton, I kind of alluded to him briefly earlier, 
who studied what he called leaf senescence, so how leaves age and die and fall off of plants. 
And students looked at his research and they looked at as funders and they said, you know, 
you're getting money from Fort Detrick. You're getting money from these military weapons labs 
that are creating Agent Orange, that are creating defoliants used in Vietnam. You are, you 
know, part of this entire apparatus. You bear some guilt for what's happening in Vietnam which 
we disagree with as students. And the response of this professor was to say, you know, ever 
since I was a little boy, I was interested in leaf senescence essentially. This comes out of my 
own innate curiosity and one year it was funded by NSF, one year it was funded by one of the 
military branches, one year it was funded from somewhere else. The funders are irrelevant. I'm 
following my own curiosity here and I'm ethically pure in my research. And so again, this sort of 
crystallizes these very thorny questions that was not a satisfying answer to a lot of student 
protestors. But from the perspective of these Princeton committees, they really have to figure 
out what it is that they value. Is this guy's research being shaped in directions that are 
dangerous or is he able to kind of keep his own intellectual interest pure somehow despite 
getting this funding? I don't know if I'm quite getting to your question. 
 
SH: Right. Because, yeah, today was we're in a—we're at a tech school here in California during 
a war on terror in the post-cold war era and I don't know how much funding we received here 
at Cal Poly from the Department of Defense but I imagine some money and certainly research 
universities writ large today in the war on terrorism are receiving copious amounts of military 
funding for drone research, for cyber warfare, for artificial intelligence, biometrics, all kinds of 
things. And the question is, how do we think about—how do we apply kind of the lessons from 
the cold war during these different ethics that Professor Bridger is exploring to understand 
some of these controversies and challenges today? Do you think—I mean, are any—are we all 
CLA students here, are there any scientists in the room? Yehey, one. Oh, great. So, you know, 
some of those challenges, what do you think about the—kind of the tradeoff, the balance of 
strategies that these major players adopted in thinking about or how you could advise us young 
scientists today? 
 
SB: Wow, that's a tall order. I mean, maybe it's a copout, I guess, in some ways in this book that 




SB: —and I'm not coming through and saying, "Here are the three rules for how to be ethical in 
this context." But I do think it's difficult. You know, maybe this sounds trite but having some 
transparency and some, you know, democratic deliberation is almost always a good thing. So, if 
you don't know what the actual contracts are, you don't know what work is being done, and 
even if you did know, there's no venue for you to articulate some kind of discontent or policy. 
That in and of itself is kind of problematic. But to give another example of an elite institution 
grappling with these issues; At MIT in the late 1960s, similar kinds of questions where there—
unlike Princeton where there really wasn't a lot of kind of weapons research taking place on 
campus. At MIT, there absolutely was and there were laboratories that were developing 
nuclear weapon systems. And so students and a lot of faculty there got pretty upset about this 
in the late 1960s and they post all sorts of different options for what the university could do. 
And one option would be to reconvert these laboratories towards civilian ends away from 
weaponry. So, to sever those contracts for explicit weapons development and to try to work 
towards other kinds of, you know, social applications for similar types of research. Another 
option would be for the university to just purge these laboratories and to try to preserve some 
sense of purity, as people used that word at the time for the university itself. And what the 
university end up doing was kind of a compromise. They kept one lab with its ties to MIT and 
they severed ties to the other lab. And the truth is that the same research that had been going 
on before took place in both of those labs. So, I don't know how useful that—that kind of 
institutional decision making necessarily is. These kinds of, you know, there are larger questions 
about what types of technology our government and our military wants to develop and that's 
probably going to get developed in different venues. So, we might ask as, you know, Noam 
Chomsky was on this committee at MIT in the late 1960s and he suggested, essentially the 
university should keep as much control over these labs as they could and even if they couldn't 
completely convert them, should keep them in their oversight and that would be a better 
solution than kind of throwing them into the private sector. You know, I don't know if that 
necessarily would have been more less effective. There's not a simple answer to this question, 
but at least they kind of talked about it and they went through all these contracts and it 
became a matter of public debate. 
 
SH: So, that's a really interesting and important point, something that comes up in the book 
repeatedly and one of the consequences of the post-Vietnam era debates that still is with us 
today, that the way some of these controversies were resolved was that the same weapons in 
military funding research moved from institutions that were democratically and publicly 
accountable and were subject to transparency and even at that time, FOIA, the Freedom of 
Information Act which was passed in 1966, subject to these different arrangements. But then 
because of the Vietnam era protest, all of that research was moved outside into the private 
sector or into nonprofit labs. And to this day, Americans are still living with the consequence of 
those, in a sense, faithful decisions because whether it be drone, cyber warfare, artificial 
intelligence, anything, brain research, a lot of things that are going on today, a lot of that 
research is being conducted out of public and democratic oversight. And so that's a really 
challenging issue that sticks with us today that's true. So, one thing that I mentioned to you 
that's related to this, just as a quick passing, has to do with the Mansfield Amendment, and that 
a lot of students I speculate don't know what the Mansfield amendment is and it was passed in 
1969. You should—can speak about it and how it kind of precipitated some of these 
institutional changes even though in some ways the funding pendulum is swinging back before 
Mansfield, but it is a very consequential amendment. 
 
SB: Yeah. I mean, you may actually have more insight into the Mansfield amendment than I do. 
But this is a kind of an opportunity to kind of look at how scientific research gets funded and to 
sort of, I guess, require that research that's being funded through these military channels as 
kind of explicit applications that can be identified as relevant to weapons development. And 
there's kind of maybe a larger question which has to do with distinction that a lot of people 
make between basic or pure research and applied research. Also, something that is clearly 
being done in order to develop a particular technology or reach a certain outcome that has all 
sorts of applications. You could call it applied research. Something that's trying to figure out the 
underlying workings of something that—I'm not doing a very articulate way of explaining this—
as sort of basic or pure research. And so, the truth is that military funders, Pentagon funders 
throughout the cold war funded both basic and applied research. And that contributed to a lot 
of these questions. Did it matter if you were doing what you thought was basic research but it 
was being funded by the Navy, for example? Does that somehow taint what you are doing? And 
so, the Mansfield Amendment was kind of a short lived exercise in trying to kind of make these 
distinctions clear and make it clear that, you know, military funded research was for these 
military purposes explicitly. 
 
SH: And it allowed then both the White House in the next administration and Congress to 
explicitly provide more authority and substantially more funding to civilian institutions such as 
the National Science Foundation or the NIH to fund basic research and biology, whereas before 
that would have come through the Department of Defense when they would be more explicitly 
looking at dual use applications of biology for both the biological warfare program and for 
maybe health and medical applications. So that's important. Well, one thing I thought that the 
students would enjoy maybe thinking about is your really fascinating point in the book about 
how the new left critique of political neutrality, one of kind of the central avenues that scientific 
and student activists took in the 1960s was as Professor Bridger just said, this idea that science 
can be neutral within an institutional context that is at war. That's in a context that is 
overwhelmingly geared towards weapon systems. And how that critique in the 1980s was co-
opted by conservative scientists who wanted to support President Reagan, star wars and STI 
program and turned in a sense this idea of scientific neutrality on its head and that break or 
that co-optation is with us today. Because today, we still live with the consequences of saying, 
"Oh, even in the areas of science, there are kind of two sides to everything." Can you speak a 
little bit through that? 
 
SB: Yeah. Yeah. 
 
SH: Because it's such an—and it's such an important insight in the book. 
 
SB: Yeah. So, to flesh out the story a little bit more, you could go back in the late 1960s, the 
American Physical Society, it's a major professional organization of physicists in the United 
States. They had a big debate over whether the organization could issue political statements. 
So, if a majority of members were opposed to the Vietnam War, could they pass a resolution 
that says that American Physical Society is opposed to the war in Vietnam? And there was a big 
battle between kind of an older generation and the younger generation within the APS and the 
older generation said, "This is our professional organization. All we do is talk about physics. We 
don't wander into politics. We don't issue sweeping moral statements. You know, we evaluate 
physics research. That's what we're here for and if we stray from that, all sorts of problems will 
be created. We will politicize our organization in a way that would be very damaging." And the 
younger generation—and so, which is to say that older generation said the American Physical 
Society is neutral. We just look at scientific research and evaluate it. The younger generation 
said, "That's ridiculous. The American Physical Society is not neutral. Lyndon Johnson comes 
and speaks at our meetings. Our research is funded by the Pentagon. We contribute 
technologies used for all of these different kinds of weapons. We're not a neutral organization 
and we shouldn't pretend to be neutral. That's in some ways even more dangerous to suggest 
that we're neutral when we're not. It's ridiculous. We should own the fact that we are political 
and we should be able to issue these kinds of political statements. That's much more honest." 
And so those—That's kind of the new left critique of the late 1960s. That critique loses out 
within the American Physical Society in the late '60s. But by the 1980s, things have changed for 
many reasons discussed in the book but we get a different problem which was that the Reagan 
administration in 1983 had proposed missile defense system known as the Strategic Defense 
Initiative or nicknamed Star Wars. And for various reasons, this alienated a lot of physicists, 
even people who are politically quite moderate were opposed to this program. And the 
American Physical Society kind of shifted gears relative to what had happened during the 
Vietnam War and they actually issued all sorts of statements opposing the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. They wrote up a long report about the technical details, but they added a kind of 
political and moral critique to it. And so, they did all these things that activists had wanted 
them to do in the late 1960s, but the response was very interesting. Conservative physicists, 
people like Edward Teller who had been part of that old guard in the American Physical Society 
in the late 1960s seized the opportunity to say, "Look, the American Physical Society is nothing 
but a big politicized body of physicists. They're not—you know, they all have a political agenda. 
You can take their technical critiques with a grain of salt because they're all a bunch of political 
activists." And so, he was able to use that kind of new left critique against the American 
Physical Society in kind of an odd way. And you see versions of this kind of analysis to say 
scientists are totally politicized. They're not neutral, they're not particularly objective. You can 
see them in some of the critiques of climate change scientists. The anti-climate change 
argument says in part, will all these scientists get lucrative research grants? Of course, they're 
going to make this argument that climate change is caused by humans. There's, you know, all 
these institutions that give them funding to say that. We can discredit them based on looking at 
the economic and political context in which they operate. Which is a kind of weird mirror image 
of that same kind of critique in the Vietnam era to say, there's no such thing as neutrality 
because scientists operate within institutions that shape what they say and do. So, that's a very 
interesting kind of argument. I would add though that I'm not sure I would say that Teller and 
the sort of handful of conservatives scientists co-opted the new left argument. I don't think that 
they were sitting around reading Bruno Latour or, you know, Thomas Kuhn necessarily, but 
maybe they were inspired perhaps by some of these earlier debates where they came to this 
argument through a, you know, somewhat circuitous root. 
 
SH: That's an interesting point. Fair, yeah. So, another issue that I thought the students might 
be interested in talking about something that I raised in my classes a lot and something that's 
implied kind of towards the beginning of your book but doesn't come out as much in the later 
Vietnam and then in the Reagan administration eras, is this concern that President Eisenhower 
first launched about a scientific and technological elite. And the era, one of the three main eras 
that Professor Bridger is discussing is post Sputnik between, you know, '58 to '64, let's say. And 
in America, we consider this to be the golden era of American science funding and even in 
education funding at large. I don't know how many students here know that that's when 
Governor Pat Brown created the higher education system in California, right, the three-tiered 
education system, the master plan. All of this was kind of in this cold war context of research 
funding. And Professor Bridger raises the issue of which a lot—for a lot of people I think, it's 
kind of fallen into the memory hole that we're all really familiar with President Eisenhower's 
critique of the military industrial complex but we're substantially less familiar with his equal 
critique of the dangers of scientific and technological elite. And at the time that President 
Eisenhower gave his farewell address in January 1961, around that same time, professor Hans 
Morgenthau for my—political scientists in the room know was a very prominent international 
relations scholar. He too wrote in the Columbia Law Review about modern science and political 
power saying that the country had been somehow fundamentally transformed because 
suddenly even above the military, above the elected civilians, above the military appointees, 
there was an unelected scientific elite. And that in both instances, Eisenhower's and 
Morgenthau's—writ large, there was a concern that this was in a sense a threat to democracy. 
And you have some great quotes of John and still saying the dangers of technological elite and 
some things along those lines and I was just wondering if you could speak to how prominent 
you thought this concern was then and if you think that that issue still plays out today. 
 
SB: Yeah, that's really interesting. I mean, I guess I—I thought a little bit about that argument in 
the context of scientist advisors in various administrations. And there, I would say both 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, I mean, even though Eisenhower said that in his speech, you know, 
he said a lot of things in that speech that didn't necessarily match with his policies had been— 
 
SH: That's true. 
 
SB: —both— I would say both Eisenhower and Kennedy were somewhat smitten with their 
science advisors. They, in many ways, thought these were really smart people who could kind of 
with, you know, laser like acuity, identify the weaknesses and various arguments and could look 
at a whole collection of weapon systems and say, you know, these ones are garbage, these 
ones are promising, these ones or this or that. And I think both Eisenhower and Kennedy kind 
of loved that. These were people who are not kind of politically angling but could be sort of 
blunt and critical and that was refreshing, I think to both of them. But I think that later 
presidents did not share that sentiment towards scientists intended to be somewhat more 
threatened or intimidated by them. You know, Johnson was not particularly interested in what 
his science advisors who kind of—you've kind of inherited the system from Kennedy and he 
wasn't really interested in what they had to say about the war in Vietnam or the technologies 
used. And certainly I think Nixon is an example of somebody who was absolutely uninterested, 
not outright hostile to many of the scientists in his administration and eventually dismantled 
the entire science advising system that Eisenhower had set up. And oddly, the language that 
Nixon might have used to describe these scientists matches some of those fears of, you know, 
an elite group of scientists who exercise undue power but shouldn't. So, that's one context to 
look at that question. You know, there's a larger question of the power of expertise that's not 
exclusive to scientists and that's a really important question. I think experts are important. They 
know a lot about something that they've, you know, spent a long time developing an in depth 
knowledge of some area that it's not that easy for everyone to do. And I think that certainly, 
you know, in US history we have kind of a tortured history of trying to deal with experts who 
are in that kind of position. I don't have exactly a good answer to that question but I think that 
as I tried to say earlier, you know, these are not abstract principles that exist independent of 
historical context. So, you can look at expertise as a problem but you have to ground it in all 
sorts of different situations of contexts and it looks different in different historical moments. 
 
SH: Right. One thing about the decision that Nixon made with the dismantling of the science 
advisory apparatus, one thing that you don't mention in your book which I think is really 
consequential and it's another place where maybe a political figure co-opted activities on the 
ground, was that President Nixon totally dismantled the biological weapons program, right? 
Unilaterally in November 1969 and he in turn then kind of converted and that was the language 
that was officially used from the biological warfare program into a biological research program, 
and those were the claims and the hopes that people like Chomsky and other scientists and 
Congress—liberal congressmen were using at that time to kind of channel, you know, bend the 
swords into plowshares idea. Could you maybe say—I don't know, I just thought it was 
interesting because two things happened at the beginning of the next administration. One is 
the biological weapons decision and the other is one you discussed that maybe you could flesh 
out the consequences of it here just a little bit more is how under Nixon and Debridge, they 
ended the defoliation, the use of Agent Orange. And why do you think it is in the literature that 
in a sense they don't get a little more credit for those two big things? 
 
SB: Yeah. That's a great question. And I mean I have to say I know a bit about converting the 
biological weapons program into something else kind of from your own research— 
 
SH: Yeah. Yes, someone like you, yeah. 
 
SB: —you may in fact give a better comment or—on the significance of that transition. I think in 
terms of Agent Orange, you know, there are few different factors. So, one is that it didn't seem 
to be as effective on the ground in Vietnam as people had hoped and so there are these studies 




SB: And they were ambiguous. And so, there wasn't a big loss in ending that program which had 
attracted so much kind of opposition and not just from the anti-war movement but from a kind 
of wider movement. And so in that sense, you know, in terms of people getting credit, but 
certainly to their credit that they ended it, but it wasn't necessarily, you know, a brave or bold 
movement. It was sort of retiring something that didn't seem to be working as effectively as 
people had hoped. And also, one of the arguments in terms of Agent Orange was that it 
contained dioxin which contaminated the land and could lead to all sorts of medical problems. 
And there were other defoliants that didn't have this problem that could be used instead. So, it 
wasn't that the defoliation operations ended but they weren't using Agent Orange. So, I guess 
I—it's not that I don't think it was a meaningful moment and I may say I talked about it in the 
book, but it's not quite as momentous maybe as it might initially seem. 
 
SH: That's right. All right. Well, I was also wondering if you could talk a little bit about how you 
view the book in challenging the conventional wisdom. Like, what in the book do you see is 
something fundamentally new both in the collections that you draw upon, the emphasis on the 
scientist perspective and their papers rather than say presidential archive or something? And 
also, in our common understandings about this era more broadly. 
 
SB: Yeah. Thanks. That's a great question. I did draw a lot from the presidential archives but 
maybe not the typical collections in those libraries. Yeah—I mean, I think that there's kind of a 
small emerging literature on science and ethics in the cold war that's looking at kind of the 




SB: —the Manhattan project. And that's really fascinating literature and it's absolutely worth 
reading. In terms of this later era, I think there's kind of a small group of scholars who are sort 
of approaching it in different ways and I do think that I hope that one of the contributions of 
this book is to look at—I mean, I guess I often get described as a historian of science and I think 




SB: There's not very much science in this book to be totally honest. It's a history of scientists 
and how they have made decisions, how other people have used their work, have used their 
status towards all sorts of different ends. And I think what I'm really trying to do here is to look 
at ideas in social and political and economic context. And I'm looking at scientists in particular. I 
think there is an element of this kind of labor history approach in some sort of subtle way in the 
book. I haven't seen that kind of perspective exactly elsewhere. I also want to talk about 
scientists as sort of introspective thoughtful people, cognizant of what they're doing. And it's 
not to say that all scientists during the cold war were, you know, performing this hand wringing, 
soul searching ethical reckoning all the time and then I talk about the fact that that's not the 




SB: —in the book. But I think, that's maybe a little bit different from some of the existing 
historiographies under the existing literature. There are a lot of studies of institutions. So, 
government advising as an institution, how did they change over time, but it doesn't necessarily 
go quite as deeply into the question of ideas which I guess I could really think are important 
since I keep harping on them here in the talk. I also think the timeframe of the book is a little bit 
different from other studies of the cold war. So, when I was writing my dissertation, I imagine 
that is from Sputnik to Star Wars. I never quite got far enough to write that last Sputnik—sorry, 
Star Wars chapter, although, that's in scientists that were the book. And so, that's a slightly 
different framing, I think, than a typical sort of cold war science framing which would look 




SB: —in a bit more depth. And so, I'm looking at it—what happened to these ideas later in the 
cold war and during moments of hot war like the war in Vietnam. 
 
SH: OK, great. Let me just ask one more just kind of related sort of question before we open it 
up to the audience, which I'm excited to hear what people have to say. One has to do with the 
persistence of secrecy and how classification of programs and secrecy kind of reign still so 
supreme in both the public and private sectors, but mostly the public and nonprofit sectors. 
And in some ways, even though we talked about the Mansfield Amendment, you rightly said it 
was short lived. That when you look at military funding, DoD funding explicitly, the pendulum 
has really swung back to almost being back in the early 1960s level. It's very, very high again, 
even though there are still civilian channels. But one thing that I think our students don't know 
or young Americans are unfamiliar with is the level to which whether it's DoD of NSF, military or 
civilian funding that the vast majority of money for basic research in the US comes from the 
government. And this raises the question of where does technological innovation come from, 
right. Especially in California, we have this romantic myth about people under garages in Silicon 
Valley and whatnot, making innovation out of scratch. But in fact, technological innovation is 
very complex process and it comes from these large institutional structures that remain 
dominated by the government and in many cases especially in the post-cold war era, in the era 
of kind of unipolarity and now the war on terror is increasingly shrouded in secrecy and 
classification and this is even heightened more with the point we discussed at the beginning 
about privatization and defense contracts outside of accountable university structures. I just 
want to know before we open up, if you could just, you know, just speak one more time about 
what you think our concern for today should be in the current political climate with all these 
secrecy surrounding even basic scientific research. 
 
SB: Yeah. That—I mean, that's a really interesting question. I—I'm not sure that my expertise 
of—exactly is kind of in the history of innovation per se, but to return to something that I 
alluded to earlier or mentioned earlier, you know, scientific research and technological 
innovation often does require labs and equipment and funding and communication among 
different people, collaboration, and that happens within institutions and—so, I don't want to 
suggest that this is a whole book about how terrible government institutions are— 
 
SH: No. No. Not at all. No. 
 
SB: —or even a book that says that there should be no resources for weapons development 




SB: —that position when you—when it comes down to it. So, you know, these are complicated 
questions. There's a kind of suborganization of historians who are active within the Society for 




SB: —I think you have a whole community devoted to kind of puncturing the myth of the 
individual brilliant college dropout in the garage— 
 
SH: That's right. 
 
SB: —arguing that, you know, a lot of the technologies that we associate with those origin 
stories actually came about through all this gigantic cold war institutional process that came 
about through kind of boring bureaucratic science— 
 
SH: That's right. 
 
SB: —almost. And so, we should be mythologizing that as much as the kind of lone inventor. 
 
SH: That's true. 
 




SB: —you know, my particular area of research as I think that is a more traditional kind of 




SB: How did these things—how did these ideas and technologies actually develop. And so, I 
would just say that I agree that these institutions play an important role. And so, to what 
extent, if you are imposing a lot of secrecy in making it difficult for people to communicate with 
each other in these open and potentially productive ways, does that harm that process? Or 
within the shroud of secrecy, are these same kinds of collaboration happening? I'm not sure I 
know the answer to that question. 
 
SH: Yeah. Yeah. Well, good. We should open it up to the audience now. But I think we should 
try to have more opportunities for people acro—you know, interdisciplinary conversations like 
this. So, it's so great to have different faculty and students and in conversation with each other. 






Moderator: [Background Music] This podcast is a 2015 production of the Robert E. Kennedy 
Library with music by Doug Irion. Visit our blog at Kennedy Library Out Loud at 
lib.calpoly.edu/outloud. There you can find other stories and media from Cal Poly San Luis 
Obispo. 
 
[Music] 
